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The proposition that a corporate manager 1 is not liable for the
debts of his corporation is part of the basic learning of all lawyers and
is understood and appreciated by all but the least sophisticated businessmen. It is equally well established, though, perhaps, less well known,
that a corporate manager is liable for his torts, although committed in
the name of and for the benefit of his corporation.' In the modern nonpossessory security transaction, which creates a varied assortment of
rights and obligations, the applicability of the foregoing principles is
frequently obscured. To illustrate, in one recent case, a corporate
manager who had not guaranteed his corporation's indebtedness was
held liable to the corporation's secured creditor for the amount of the
corporation's debt.'
Admiral Corporation, an appliance manufacturer, sold merchandise
on credit to Winchester Corporation, a retail appliance dealer. To
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. B.E. 1944, Yale University; M.B.A. 1948, Harvard University; LL.B. 1965, University of Pennsylvania.
Member, Pennsylvania Bar.
1 The term "manager" is used in the title and text of this Article to identify the
individual whose responsibilities may be generally described as running the business
of a corporation. In most instances he will be an officer. In some he will be a
director. He may, not infrequently, be a stockholder. Occasionally, he will be none
of the above. Whatever his official position, the duties discussed herein depend on
his function-not on his title.
23 W. FrETcHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 1135 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1965).
3
Admiral Corp. v. Winchester Corp., 7 UCC REP. SEav. 743 (N.Y. Civ. Ct.
1970). The facts have been simplified to illustrate better the precise problems discussed herein.
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secure payment of the purchase price, Admiral requested and was
granted a security interest in the merchandise and the proceeds of its
sale. Winchester, of course, was authorized to sell the merchandise to
its retail customers and agreed to segregate the proceeds of sale from
its other property. Periodically, Winchester was to account to Admiral
for merchandise that had been sold, paying to Admiral the cost of such
merchandise and, presumably, retaining the balance for its own use.
Things did not go well for Winchester. In a desperate effort to
save its failing business, the proceeds of sale of Admiral products were
used to pay other legitimate corporate obligations. Not surprisingly,
the effort was unsuccessful, and the corporation subsequently went out
of business leaving Admiral unpaid. Admiral's security interest had
evaporated.
Brown was an officer, director, and substantial shareholder of
Winchester. It was Brown who, on behalf of Winchester, contracted
for the purchase of the appliances and executed the security agreement.
It was also Brown who, again on behalf of Winchester, failed to
segregate the proceeds, paid the other corporate creditors and, in a very
practical sense, was responsible for Winchester's failure to pay Admiral.
There is no indication that Admiral had sought Brown's personal guarantee. Almost certainly, it had not obtained it.
Knowing full well that Winchester was unable to respond to a
judgment, Admiral sued the corporation on two causes of action. On
the first count-breach of contract to repay the indebtedness-the .corporation was undeniably liable. The corporation's liability on the
second count-conversion of the collateral-was of only theoretical interest because the damages sustained by Admiral were coincidental with
and limited by the amount of the unpaid debt. On the second count,
however, Brown was joined as an additional defendant.
Admitting the facts, Brown denied liability on the ground that
Winchester's arrangement with Admiral "was merely an agreement to
purchase merchandise . . . for the purpose of resale and . . . [to
turn over] the proceeds of the resale . . . to Admiral" 4 -an agreement

to which he, Brown, was not a party. The court granted summary
judgment against Brown. Emphasizing that the parties had themselves characterized the transaction as a "trust arrangement," it held
that the corporation "was trustee of the goods . .

.

[and] the pro-

ceeds," ' that violation of the terms of the agreement was a breach of
trust, and that both the corporation and the participating manager were
guilty of conversion.
4 Id. at 744.

5 Id. at 745.
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Quite clearly, Brown's contention that he was a stranger to the
transaction flies in the face of reality. He was, by his own admission,
an active participant at all stages of negotiation and performance and
had full knowledge of both the contract and the probable consequence
of its breach. On the other hand, it seems equally unrealistic to
categorize Brown as a fiduciary, with all the responsibilities such a
relationship implies. The actual relationship between corporate manager and secured creditor lies somewhere between these extremes. This
Article will explore the nature and extent of the noncontractual duty
owed by a manager of a corporate debtor to his corporation's secured
creditors in the light of contemporary security law and the reasonable
commercial expectations of businessmen.
I. THE COMMERCIAL SETTING
A. Contemporary Security Law
1. The Limits of the UCC
One might suppose that all of the common business relationships
arising out of a secured transaction would be regulated by article 9
of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).' Such is not the case.
Notwithstanding the draftsmen's stated aim to set "out a comprehensive
scheme for the regulation of security interests in personal property," 7
the same draftsmen, in the same Comment, concede that "[t] he rules set
out in . . . article [9] are principally concerned with the limits of
the secured party's protection against purchasers from and creditors
of the debtor." ' Indeed, the most significant cases concerning the
security aspects of commercial financing do involve disputes between
the secured creditor and the other creditors of the debtor, frequently
represented by the debtor's trustee in bankruptcy. Part 3 of article 9,
entitled Rights of Third Parties,contains a detailed set of priority rules
under which most, if not all, such disputes ought to be resolved. But
part 3 does not deal with the rights and obligations of all third parties,
that is, persons who are not parties to the security agreement. Notably,
the manager of a corporate debtor is not a "third party" within the
scope of part 3 or any other part of article 9.
In a less comprehensive manner, other parts of article 9 deal with
the relationship between the secured party and the debtor. Part 2 prescribes the requisites for the formation of a valid security agreement
6References are to the 1962 Official Text. Uncited articles, parts, sections
(designated with §), and comments in the text of this Article will refer to this source.
7 Unj'oaM COM MCIAL CODE § 9-101, Comment (first paragraph).

8Id. (final paragraph).
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and, together with part 5, sets forth some general rules concerning the
respective rights and duties of the secured party and the debtor, particularly after default. As the draftsmen comment, however, "[e]xcept
for procedure on default, freedom of contract prevails between the immediate parties to the security transaction." 0 Thus, the securedparty/debtor relationship is not governed primarily by the UCC, but
rather by the agreement of the parties, which is presumably binding on
them alone. Except, then, to the extent that the managers of a corporate debtor may choose to become parties to the security agreement,
the UCC imposes no express duties on them.
One jurisdiction appears to have recognized this problem and has
attempted to deal with it in its version of the UCC. As a unique addition to the official text, Illinois has enacted § 9-306.01, which provides:
(1) It is unlawful for a debtor under the terms of a
security agreement (a) who has no right of sale or other
disposition of the collateral or (b) who has a right of sale or
other disposition of the collateral and is to account to the
secured party for the proceeds of any sale or other disposition
of the collateral, to sell or otherwise dispose of the collateral
and willfully and wrongfully to fail to pay the secured party
the amount of said proceeds due under the security agreement.
(4) In the event the debtor under the terms of a security
agreement is a corporation or a partnership, any officer, director, manager, or managerial agent of the debtor who
violates this Section or causes the debtor to violate this
Section shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary for not less than one year nor
more than ten years.' 0
The Permanent Editorial Board for the UCC has not recommended
this provision for uniform adoption. Its tersely stated reason for rejection is that "[t]his kind of criminal provision has no proper place
in a commercial statute; it belongs in the criminal code." " Irrespective
of the merits of having any criminal provision, the Board's reason for
exclusion from the UCC seems sound.
Curiously, neither the Illinois legislature, in its adoption of this
section, nor the Permanent Editorial Board, in its rejection, appears to
have considered the imposition of civil liability on the offending corporate manager. Whether or not criminal penalties are justified, the
9 Id.
0

ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 26, § 9-306.01 (Smith-Hurd 1963).
11 PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM CoMmERCIAL CODE, REPORT
1

No. 2, § 9-306.01, at 213 (West ed. 1965) (comment).
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imposition of personal liability to the injured party seems an entirely
appropriate sanction for a commercial statute to apply to a businessman
who acts wrongfully in the performance of a commercial transaction.
The failure of Illinois to consider civil liability may be attributable
to inadvertence,' but other possible explanations exist. First, the
criminal sanction might be viewed as a sufficient deterrent to wrongful
conduct. Secondly, the statutory imposition of criminal liability is, a
fortiori, a sufficient basis for the imposition of civil liability, without
express statutory support. Neither reason is persuasive.
The injured secured party has scant interest in putting his corporate debtor's managers in jail. His primary, if not his only, interest is
in recouping his loss. He would therefore have little incentive to institute a criminal prosecution, and deterrence is likely to suffer. Further,
the determination whether civil liability should be imposed involves
considerations quite different from those involved when the penalty is
incarceration. The standard of proof, the requisite mental element, the
end the law was intended to achieve, and the class of individuals entitled
to press the action, all may, and should, vary according to whether the
penalty is criminal or civil.-3 A criminal provision provides little
guidance for courts that are confronted with the claim that civil recovery
is implied by the existence of the criminal provision. Recovery of
damages from another businessman, one who has dealt improperly with
the plaintiff, should present fewer procedural and substantive obstacles
than successful criminal prosecution. Extrapolation from a criminal
provision is less than an ideal way to reach this result. 4
The failure of the UCC's draftsmen to deal expressly with the
secured-party/manager relationship in terms of civil liability may be
explained on other grounds. Section 1-103 provides that "[u]nless
displaced by the particular provisions of [the UCCI . . . the principles
of law and equity . . . shall supplement its provisions."

Thus, it is

contemplated that, under the UCC, as was the case under pre-UCC
security law, the claims that secured parties may assert against the
managers of their corporate debtors will be adjudicated by the appli12 The troubled history of the criminal provision, which dates back to 1874, is
discussed in the comment following the statute. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 26, § 9-306.01
(Smith-Hurd 1963) (comment).
13 See, e.g., Note, The Use of Criminal Statutes in the Creation of New Torts,
48 CoLu.. L. REv. 456 (1948).
14 Provisions similar to Illinois' criminal provision appear in a number of criminal
codes. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CoDE § 504b (West 1970); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 185.05
(McKinney 1967). In connection with its criminal provisions, Vermont has an
interesting penalty section, which provides for a fine not to exceed twice the value of
the collateral, with one-half of the fine payable to the injured party. VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 13, § 2075 (Supp. 1971). There is generally no express reference to the liability
of the managers of a debtor corporation such as that contained in Illinois' provision.
See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 26, § 9-306.01(4) (Smith-Hurd 1963).
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cation of such principles of property, tort, corporate, fiduciary, and
agency law as may seem appropriate for doing justice in a particular
case.
2. The Impact of the

UCC

The inapplicability of any express UCC provision does not mean
that the UCC will or should have no influence on the resolution of
secured-party/manager disputes. The contemporary secured transaction
is a creature of the UCC, and its impact on both the parties' structuring
of their security transactions and the courts' attitudes toward those
transactions will surely be felt. To the extent that the UCC has changed
prior security law it will have an effect on all problems growing
out of it.
Perhaps the most pervasive of the changes is the abandonment of
distinctions based on form."5 While the old forms of secured transactions are still permitted and may, for many years, in fact be used, the
choice of a particular form will be immaterial to the determination of
the very important rights and obligations that are expressly covered
by the provisions of article 9 and that constitute the subject matter
of most security transaction litigation. As a consequence, parties will,
in a search for certainty of result flowing from uniformity of interpretation, increasingly couch their agreements in UCC terminology.' 6
Even when the parties cling to the old forms, 17 the courts, conditioned by a system of security law that ignores form in favor of
substance for the resolution of the most common disputes, will be less
inclined to give formalities the weight they were accorded under preUCC law. A court that, in the majority of cases before it, can draw
no distinctions between a conditional sale and a chattel mortgage or
between a factor's lien and a consignment, is far less likely to hold, as
did the court in Admiral Corp. v. Winchester Corp.,'" that a party is a
"trustee" simply because he had characterized his security arrangement
as a "trust receipt." As long ago as 1934, when formalism may have
15 "The scheme of the Article is to make distinctions, where distinctions are
necessary, along functional rather than formal lines." UNIFORm ComMERCLAL CODE
§ 9-101, Comment (eleventh paragraph).
16 [T]he selection of the set of terms applicable to any one of the existing
forms . . . might carry .

.

. the implication that the existing law . . . was

to be used for the construction and interpretation of this Article.
[A] set of terms has been chosen which have no common law or statutory
roots ....

Id. § 9-105, Comment 1.
17 A list of the old forms to which article 9 applies is contained in id. § 9-102(2).
"This does not mean that the old forms may not be used, and Section 9-102(2) makes
it clear that they may be." Id. § 9-101, Comment (eighth paragraph).
18 See note 3 supra & accompanying text.
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been essential to the validity of a security interest, Mr. Justice Cardozo,
in holding a debt dischargeable under the Bankruptcy Act,'19 stated that
an "obligation is not turned into one arising from a trust because the
parties to one of the documents have chosen to speak of it as a trust." 20
If the defendant in the Admiral case should have been held liable, as I
suspect he should, it is because of what he did and not what he called
himself. The scheme of article 9 clearly calls for a functional analysis.
Under the UCC there is no longer any requirement that the secured
party retain a measure of dominion and control over the collateral in
order to have a valid security interest. By its express repeal of the
doctrine of Benedict v. Ratner,2 § 9-205 permits the secured party to
repose complete faith in the debtor without fear of losing his position
vis-a-vis other creditors or the debtor himself. However imprudent
such a course may be, the secured party may now, to an extent not
heretofore possible in many jurisdictions, choose to rely upon the
debtor's integrity to protect his interest.' When the debtor is a corporation, that reliance is necessarily placed on its managers, and questions
of manager liability may arise with increasing frequency in the future.
Furthermore, the UCC permits the creation of security interests
in personal property, many types of which could not heretofore be used
as collateral and some that were not even conceived of when concepts of property and tort law were being developed. To confuse matters
still more, § 9-306 provides for the automatic transfer of a security
interest to whatever other property is received whenever collateral is
sold, exchanged, collected, or otherwise disposed of. Legal rules that
have been satisfactorily applied to machinery and groceries may prove
inadequate to deal with television rights, goodwill, or even cash.
Finally, § 1-203 expresses "an obligation of good faith" that pervades the entire UCC. While "good faith" is an ancient concept in the
19 Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 293 U.S. 328 (1934). The issue was whether
an automobile dealer had been discharged from liability to a financer to whom he had
given, among other documents a trust receipt. Section 17(4) of the Bankruptcy
Act, ch. 541, § 14, 30 Stat. 530 (1898), as amended, Act of Jan. 7, 1922, ch. 22,
42 Stat. 354, provided then, substantially as § 17(a) (4) of the Bankruptcy Act,
11 U.S.C. § 35(a) (4) (1970), does now, that a bankrupt was not released from
liabilities that "were created by his fraud, embezzlement, misappropriation, or defalcation while acting as an officer or in any fiduciary capacity."
20 Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 293 U.S. 328, 334 (1934).
21268 U.S. 353 (1925). The case held that a security assignment of receivables
without imposing on the assignor any duty to account for the collections was void,
under New York law, against the trustee in bankruptcy. In the oft-quoted words of
Mr. Justice Brandeis, the transaction was conclusively fraudulent "because of the
reservation of dominion inconsistent with the effective disposition of title and creation
of a lien." Id. at 363; see UxnoRM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-205, Comment 1.
22UNFoRM COMMRCIAL CODE §9-205, Comment 5. "[B]usiness and not legal
reasons will determine the extent to which strict accountability, segregation of collections, daily reports and the like will be employed." Id.
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law,' its application has frequently lacked statutory support. Of course,
the appropriate limits for the application of § 1-203 will require judicial
determination, but the mere presence of the section in the basic statute
governing security transactions may facilitate the regulation of morally
questionable conduct that might otherwise be regarded as within
the law.
Thus, while the UCC does not directly address itself to the securedparty/manager relationship, its enormous impact on the totality of
security law may require courts to re-examine their heretofore formalistic approach. At the very least, it will give them the opportunity to
do so-an opportunity that ought not to be ignored.
B. Commercial Expectations
The creditor who extends unsecured credit to a corporation is
satisfied to look for repayment to the general pool of corporate assets.
He assumes the risk that the corporation may become insolvent, leaving
him unpaid, with full knowledge that insolvency may result not only
from factors beyond the management's control but also, wholly or in
part, from the manner in which the managers conduct the enterprise.
Such a creditor must appreciate the possibility that the corporation may
breach its obligation to repay him and may, in the event of such breach,
reasonably expect to recover nothing from the managers as individuals
unless they have fraudulently transferred corporate assets to themselves
or for their benefit.
The insulation of corporate managers from liability to the corporation's creditors can, of course, be eliminated by obtaining the managers'
personal guarantees. Financing agreements of commercial lenders frequently have such guarantees printed directly under the place for the
corporate borrower's execution or on a supplementary sheet conveniently
attached. A lender will often request such guarantees or even demand
them as a condition of extending credit. If successful in obtaining them
from financially responsible individuals, he may regard them as a welcome addition, or even a preferred alternative, to a security interest in
the corporate debtor's assets.
The value of such guarantees extends well beyond the protection
they afford in the event of the borrower's subsequent insolvency. Since
the guarantors control the operations of the borrower, they can, in their
own interest, be counted upon to make every effort to ensure that
the guaranteed creditor is paid in preference to those creditors who
23 The concept in commercial transactions dates back to the Roman law and the
English law merchant. See Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial
Reasonableness Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. CHL L. REv. 666 (1963) ;
Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REv. 195 (1968).
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were not sufficiently strong, smart, or lucky to obtain guarantees of
their own. As evidence of this motivation, one need only witness the
desperate efforts of the managers of a failing corporation to make sure
that withheld taxes, for which they are made personally liable by
statute,24 are paid before the doors finally close.
On the other hand, such guarantees are not lightly given. The
very essence of the corporate form is the insulation of individuals from
liability. While, under certain circumstances, the corporate managers
might be persuaded to pledge their individual credit as security for what
might be their corporation's most significant obligation, they will, in
the typical case, make every effort to avoid doing so. If a lender, notwithstanding his failure to obtain requested guarantees, proceeds to
extend credit to the corporation, the managers may quite reasonably
anticipate that they will not be liable if the corporation fails, for whatever reason, to pay its debt.
Unlike the unsecured creditor, and like the guaranteed creditor,
the creditor who demands security is unwilling to rely solely on the
corporation's promise to pay. In addition, he acquires a second promise
that certain corporate assets will be applied to the satisfaction of his
claim if the corporation fails to keep promise number one. Through
the mechanism provided in article 9, promise number two, if it is kept,
can be made effective against the competing claims of other creditors.
But promise number two is still the promise of only the corporation
and, unlike the guarantee, creates no contractual rights against the
corporate managers.
The secured creditor's hope is that he has insulated himself against
the risk of the debtor's insolvency. Whether he has succeeded depends
on the satisfaction of two conditions at the time of default: the value of
the collateral must equal or exceed the then unpaid balance of the
debt, and the creditor's interest in the collateral must have been preserved. To an extent that varies with the nature of the particular
transaction, the satisfaction of each of these conditions is within the
control of the corporate management.
The value of almost every type of commercial collateral is, to some
degree, subject to impairment by management conduct. The value of
inventory can be adversely affected by unwise decisions on what to buy
or manufacture. Accounts can shrink in value because of the injudicious
extension of credit. Contract rights can evaporate if the debtor fails to
perform its end of the bargain. Even fixed assets can be rendered less
valuable by management's failure to provide satisfactory maintenance
or to have anticipated technological change. So long as a manager acts
24 INT.

RFv.

CODE OF

1954, § 6672; id. § 6671(b) (definitions).
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without corrupt motive and in good faith in conducting the corporation's
affairs, he incurs no liability to the corporation for honest mistakes in
judgment.'
Similarly, a secured creditor cannot reasonably expect
errorless management. This is true even when management's errors
might result in the diminution of the value of his collateral. Though
the value of the collateral, at the critical juncture of default, may be
less than he had anticipated, he gets no less than that for which he
bargained."
With respect to the preservation of his interest in the collateral,
however, the secured creditor's expectations are quite different. Though
he cannot reasonably entertain the notion that the corporate managers
have a duty to him to preserve the value of particular corporate assets
just because they happen also to serve as collateral, the creditor does
expect, quite reasonably, to have a prior claim to such value as remains.
When the corporation has possession of or control over the collateral,
as is the case in most commercial security transactions, the corporation's
managers have the power to defeat or diminish the interest of the
secured creditor.2 When they do so, in derogation of the corporation's
obligation, the non-guaranteeing manager's expectation to be free from
liability to corporate creditors and the secured creditor's expectation to
realize on the bargained-for collateral cannot both be satisfied. In the
particular circumstances of a given case, the determination as to which
of these two conflicting expectations is more justified may be the proper
basis for decision.
II. THE

TROUBLE WITH CONVERSION

The traditional route to recovery by a secured party from a corporate manager who has caused his corporation to deal improperly with
25 3 W. FLETCHER, supra note 2, § 1039.
26 The secured party will normally seek protection against a decline in the value

of collateral in 2 ways.

He will demand an initial cushion of value above the

amount of the secured indebtedness, and he will require a clause enabling him to
accelerate the maturity of the debt in the event of a decline. UCC § 1-208 expressly
permits such clauses, but requires them to be exercised only in good faith. The protection they afford, however, may be illusory. When the collateral consists of working capital or operating assets, the attempt to realize on it in a distress situation may
further depress its value. In many cases, the creditor may elect to ride out the
storm rather than precipitate a forced sale and the immediate termination of the
business. This is a risk he knowingly undertakes.
27 The manner by and extent to which a secured creditor's interest can be defeated depend on the nature of the particular transaction. The dissipation of cash
proceeds of sale or collection is the most obvious. Security interests in goods and
negotiable instruments and documents, even when properly perfected, can be totally
defeated in the circumstances set forth in UCC §§ 9-307, 9-308, and 9-309. Unauthorized dispositions in which the security interest is theoretically preserved may put the
collateral beyond the practical reach of the creditor or, at the very least, subject him
to the expense of a law suit to get it back. Merely moving the collateral, the
records, or the debtor's office may, in some cases, result in a security interest becoming
unperfected. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL. CODE §§ 9-103(3), 9-401 (Alternative Subsection (3)).
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the collateral securing a corporate obligation has been to allege conversion." According to that theory, the corporation has converted the
secured party's property to its own use, and the manager who has participated in the tort is jointly liable for damages. 9 Although Professor
Prosser states that conversion "almost defies definition," 30 the authors
of the Restatement of Torts have defined it as
an intentional exercise of dominion or control over a chattel
which so seriously interferes with the right of another to control it that the actor may justly be required to pay the other
the full value of the chattel.3 '
Conversion is an ancient tort, and the course of its development
in various jurisdictions has been far from uniform.3 Its application in
a commercial setting presents conceptual difficulties wholly unrelated to
the issue of commercial morality. Consequently, conversion, doctrinally
applied, as it almost invariably has been, may occasionally impose liability when none should result and may negate liability in circumstances
that, by contemporary standards of commercial morality, clearly demand it. The aspects of the "generation gap" between traditional conversion doctrine and the real world of commercial financing illustrated
below suggest that, perhaps, a less traditional and more functional
analysis should be applied.
A. Property
The UCC takes the sweeping approach that "any personal property" 33may be made subject to a security interest, and includes within
its scope a category of "general intangibles," which are defined as "any
personal property .

.

. other than goods, accounts, contract rights,

chattel paper, documents and instruments." " In a comment, the draftsmen suggest that this term embraces "miscellaneous types of contractual
rights and other personal property which are used or may become customarily used as commercial security

.

.

."

such as "goodwill, literary

rights and rights to performance." "
The historical antecedent of conversion is the common-law action
of trover in which it was alleged that the plaintiff had lost a chattel and
2
8Although all the cases that have come to my attention have used the term
"conversion," the term, as used herein, would include all actions based on the premise
the collateral is the property of the secured party, e.g., trespass to chattels.
that 29
See 3 W. FLETcHIER, supra note 2, § 1140.
30 W. PRossER, LAw OF TORTS § 15, at 79 (4th ed. 1971).
31
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 222A(1) (1966).
32 See W. PROSSER, supra note 30, § 15, at 79-81.
3
3 UNIFORM C MMRCIAL CODE § 9-102(1).
34
Id. § 9-106.
3
5 Id. § 9-106, Comment (emphasis added).
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that the defendant had found it." The courts have modified but not
obliterated this imprint of history. Although, initially, only tangible
chattels could be converted, the action has been expanded to include intangible rights merged in a piece of paper.3 7 This expansion, however,
has been neither complete nor uniform. Professor Prosser observes
that "[t]here is perhaps no very valid and essential reason why there
might not be conversion of an ordinary debt, the good will of a business,
or even an idea," 3 but thus far the majority of jurisdictions hold that
an ordinary debt cannot be converted, and there is general agreement
that there can be no conversion of what the UCC describes as a general intangible. 9
An example of the difficulties that might beset the courts in
applying conversion theory to unconventional collateral is provided by
Pickford Corp. v. De-Luxe Laboratories,Inc.4" Plaintiff had delivered
the original negatives of a motion picture to defendant, which was in
the business of making prints. Without authorization from plaintiff,
defendant delivered several prints to a third party, who thereafter exhibited the film on television. In a suit for conversion, the court held
that the relevant property was not the actual reels of film, conversion of
which was subject to a three-year statute of limitations, but the "intangible incorporeal right" incorporated therein. An action for interference with that right, which the court was willing to call conversion,
was, according to the court's reading of a California case, subject to a
two-year statute of limitations that had since run. In a supplemental
opinion in the same case,' the same judge held that while the processor's
unauthorized delivery might not constitute conversion, the unauthorized
exhibition did not constitute conversion. The exhibition did, he conceded, amount to some tort subject to the then-expired, two-year statute,
and, hence, there was no need to define it further. He did not do so.
Even property conventionally used as collateral can prove troublesome in an action for conversion. In Petroleum Marketing Corp. v.
Metropolitan Petroleum Corp.,' decided by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court in 1959, Petroleum had sold its operating assets to Metropolitan.
Expressly included in the sale were " 'all franchises, licenses, trademarks, trade names, customers and other records and ledgers . . .'

"

36 See W. PRossza, supra note 30, § 15, at 79.

37 See id. 81, 82.
8
8Id. 82.
39 Id. 82-83.
40 161 F. Supp. 367 (S.D. Cal. 1958).
41 Picldord Corp. v. De-Luxe Laboratories, Inc., 169 F. Supp. 118 (S.D. Cal.

1958).
42 396 Pa. 48, 151 A.2d 616 (1959).
43 Id. at 50, 151 A.2d at 618 (quoting the agreement of sale) (emphasis added
by court).
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The accounts receivable were retained by Petroleum, which authorized
Metropolitan to collect them as its agent. Things went along smoothly
for six months, but Petroleum then became dissatisfied with Metropolitan's collection efforts and demanded that all records of uncollected
accounts be turned over to Petroleum. Because of what the court
described as "honest differences between the parties to protect their
respective interests," 44 Metropolitan delayed turning over the records
for a period of about two months. When Metropolitan finally tendered
the records, Petroleum rejected them and brought an action for the
amount of the uncollected accounts, alleging that Metropolitan had converted them.
In affirming judgment for Metropolitan, the court first held that
the records had been sold to Metropolitan, were Metropolitan's property, and, hence, could not be converted by Metropolitan. The court
then went on to say, "[a] s for the debts apart from the paper record
of them, these were choses in action and not subject to conversion." 4
For its only authority on this point, the court cited an 1899 New York
case."
One should particularly note that Pennsylvania is a leading
commercial jurisdiction; that accounts-receivable financing was commonplace in 1959; and that the UCC had been in effect for over
four years.4
With such a precedent on the books, might it be anticipated that a
corporate manager who made a second assignment of accounts receivable previously assigned by the corporation would be free of liability to
the first assignee, while a corporate manager who sold a machine,
previously mortgaged by the corporation, would be liable to the mortgagee? Certainly such a distinction, unrelated to the quality of the
manager's conduct, would be untenable, and one would hope that it
would not be made. To avoid it, however, will require either a change
in the law of conversion as stated as recently as 1959 or the adoption
of another basis of liability.
Goodwill may be a substantial, if not the major, asset of a business
and is frequently expressly included in the collateral subjected to a
security interest in comprehensive financing agreements. Its components, apart from general reputation, may include such intangible property as customer lists, secret processes, confidential formulas and unique
operational ideas. The secured creditor's interest in such components
44 Id. at 53, 151 A.2d at 620.
45 Id. at 52, 151 A.2d at 619.

46
"It was agreed that the transaction is governed by the law of New York,
where the contract was made." Id. at 51, 151 A.2d at 619.
47 Pennsylvania was the first state to adopt the UCC. P.L. 3, April 6, 1953. It
became effective on July 1, 1954. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 10-101 (1970).
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lies in the preservation of their confidentiality. A manager of a failing
corporation might be inclined to disclose them to third parties in return
for an injection of cash into the corporate treasury. None appear ever
to have been held proper subjects for an action of conversion.4" Yet
their unauthorized disclosure might destroy the secured party's interest
in the collateral as effectively as if a negotiable instrument, subject to
his security interest, had been transferred to a holder in due course and
the proceeds applied to the payment of other corporate obligations. 49
If such conduct is to result in the manager's personal liability, conversion as presently limited seems an inappropriate tool for the job.
B. Security Interest
Since the right to bring an action in trover was based on the right
to immediate possession,"0 there was, at one time, a nice question
whether the holder of a security interest could maintain an action for
conversion before default. It is now well established that a secured
party with a property interest in futuro may bring such an action, but
his recovery is limited to the unpaid balance of his debt. 1 The question
that has perplexed the courts is whether the claimant has a property
interest or a mere contractual right. If only the latter, conversion will
not lie.
An excellent example of a court's typical line of inquiry is provided
by a fifty-year-old New York case, Hinkle Iron Co. v. Kohn. 2 To
secure payment for materials supplied by Hinkle, a contractor corporation, acting through Kohn, its president and principal stockholder, made
a written assignment to Hinkle of $4500 of a designated payment to
become due the corporation under a contract with the city. At Kohn's
request, and for the benefit of the corporation's credit standing, Hinkle
agreed not to file the assignment with the city, and was content to rely
on Kohn's oral promise that he would see that the amount so assigned
would be paid to Hinkle as soon as the corporation received the payment. When the payment was received by the corporation, $2500 was
paid to Hinkle, but the balance was used to satisfy other corporate
creditors. The corporation subsequently became bankrupt. Hinkle did
not seek to enforce Kohn's promise but, instead, sued in tort, alleging
that Kohn had converted its property.
The essence of Kohn's defense was that an unearned future payment was not in esse, could not be legally assigned and, hence, could
§ 15, at 82 & nn. 4, 5.
49 UNIFORM COMMERCrAM CODE § 9-309; id. § 9-306, Comment 2(c).
50 Ames, The History of Trover, 11 HARV. L. REv. 277 (1897).
51 See W. PROSSER, szpra note 30, § 15, at 95-96.
52 229 N.Y. 179, 128 N.E. 113 (1920).
48 See W. PRossER, supra note 30,
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not be converted, and that legal ownership was an essential prerequisite
to an action in conversion.5 3 The Appellate Division agreed and directed judgment dismissing the complaint. In dictum, the court suggested that filing the assignment with the proper city officials would
have operated as an equitable assignment, putting the fund beyond the
control of the corporation. 4 Even then, however, if the city had
mistakenly paid the corporation, an action of mandamus, not conversion,
would lie. In summary, the court held:
It is elementary that, to maintain an action for conversion, the
plaintiff must show a legal ownership to the particular thing
alleged to have been converted. The action cannot be predicated upon an equitable interest or a mere breach of contract
obligation. The complaint does not state a cause of action in
conversion. 5The Court of Appeals reversed."6

"The instrument of assign-

ment," it observed, "was not an agreement .

.

.

. It consisted of

words of transfer rather than of contract." 57 In the court's view an
equitable assignment 58 had been established and a property interest
created. From that point it was an easy step to say that
[t]he corporation received . . . the assigned sum in a trust

capacity, because the sum was equitably the property of the
plaintiff, which the corporation, as the owner of the legal title,
was authorized to receive and hold only for the purpose of
delivery to the plaintiff. 9
Of course, once it is determined that a defendant is a "trustee" there's
not much hope for him. In the court's view, the language of grant in
the instrument was the critical factor in its decision. Without that
language, presumably, the plaintiff's right would have been merely
contractual, and the defendant not liable.
Under the UCC, even that formal distinction disappears. In
Warren Tool Co. v. Stephenson,' a case strikingly similar to Hinkle,
there was no instrument of assignment. A corporation had accepted
55

184 App. Div. 181, 182-83, 171 N.Y.S. 537 (1918).

54Id. at 183, 171 N.Y.S. at 538-39.

55
Id. at 184, 171 N.Y.S. at 539.
5
6 Hinkle Iron Co. v. Kohn, 229 N.Y. 179, 128 N.E. 113 (1920).
57Id. at 182-83, 128 N.E. at 114.
58 According to the court, the relevant test for an equitable assignment
is the inquiry whether or not an assignment makes an appropriation of the
fund so that the debtor would be justified in paying the debt or the assigned
part to the person claiming to be the assignee.

Id. at 183, 128 N.E. at 114.
59 Id., 128 N.E. at 114.
60 11 Mich. App. 274, 161 N.W.2d 133 (1968),
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the plaintiff's bid to provide the tooling required by the corporation to
perform a contract with Highway Products, Inc. Unwilling to extend
unsecured credit, the plaintiff suggested that the Highway account be
assigned to it and that Highway be so notified. Fearing the adverse
effect that such notification would have on its relationship with Highway, the corporation offered a counterproposal whereby it would send
a letter to its regular bank of deposit, instructing the bank to pay the
corporation's debt directly to plaintiff out of the proceeds of two
specified Highway orders, copies of which were attached. A copy of
that letter was sent to plaintiff, which thereupon proceeded to fill the
corporation's order.
When the check in payment for the first of the specified Highway
orders was received by the corporation, Stephenson, the corporation's
president, took it to another bank and exchanged it for cashier's checks,
which he then used for the payment of other corporate obligations.
Nine days later, the corporation filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy. The plaintiff sued Stephenson and a fellow manager individually.
Here, as in Hinkle, the corporation had agreed to apply a fund to
be received to the payment of a particular creditor. But unlike Hinkle,
there were no "words of transfer rather than of contract." The court
reasoned, quite properly, that an article 9 security interest could be
created without special words of transfer, provided only that the parties
intended the transaction to have effect as security." It also held that
the corporation's letter to the bank satisfied the requirement of a writing set forth in § 9-203(1) (b). The court felt compelled, however, to
discuss at great length the conceptual distinctions between equitable
assignments and equitable liens and concluded that the plaintiff had an
equitable lien on the Highway check. It then followed, as a matter of
course, that the defendants might be liable in conversion.
The troublesome aspect of the Hinkle and Warren cases, and the
many others like them,' is that they focus on the metaphysical quality
of the plaintiff's interest and, only as an afterthought, if at all, on the
moral quality of the defendant's conduct. If a corporate manager deals
wrongfully (by whatever standards the commercial world deems appropriate) with collateral in the possession of or under the control of his
61

"[T]he principal test whether a transaction comes under this Article is: is the

transaction intended to have effect as security?"

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

§ 9-102,

Comment 1. "The only requirements for the enforceability of non-possessory security
interests . . . are (a) a writing; (b) the debtor's signature; and (c) a description
of the collateral . . . ." Id. § 9-203, Comment 1. In some courts the concept of
formalism dies hard. See, e.g., American Card Co. v. H.M.H. Co., 97 RI. 59, 196
A.2d 150 (1963).
62 See, e.g., Hirsch v. Phily, 4 N.J. 408, 73 A.2d 173 (1950).
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corporation, liability should result whether the creditor's interest in that
collateral is described as legal, equitable, or merely contractual. When
the creditor sues in conversion, the proper inquiry may never be
reached.
C. Intentional Act
The comprehensive security agreement will normally contain a
prodigious number of debtor's covenants. Some will be negative,
capable of breach only by malfeasance. Others will be affirmative and
may be breached by mere inaction. In general, nonfeasance is not
sufficient to establish conversion. Only intentional conduct is.'
The distinction between malfeasance and nonfeasance is not always
crystal-clear. Thus, although § 9-503 presumably gives a secured party
the "right to take possession" upon default, it expressly permits the
parties to agree on the extent of the debtor's obligations to deliver or
make the collateral available. Since the essence of trover was the defendant's refusal to surrender a chattel to the plaintiff upon the latter's
demand, a corporate manager who, without justification, refused a
secured party access to the collateral upon default would probably be
deemed a converter, notwithstanding the usual requirement of an intentional act.' If, however, the security agreement imposed affirmative
duties on the corporation as, for example, "to assemble the collateral"
or to "make it available . . . at a place to be designated by the secured
party," 65 the failure to cause the corporation to perform these duties

would probably not amount to a conversion, even if it resulted in a substantial, unanticipated loss to the secured party."'
Pre-default covenants may produce similar difficulties. Consider,
for example, the typical covenant providing that the debtor will not
move the collateral without the secured party's prior consent. If the
63 See W. PROSSER,

supra note 30, § 15, at 83.

64 Id. 89-90.
65

UFORm CommERcAL CODE § 9-503 (expressly permitting the secured party to
require such duties by agreement).
66 Prosser notes one exception to the notion that nonfeasance does not constitute
conversion. W. PROSSER, supra note 30, § 15, at 83. In that case, defendant-railroadagent refused plaintiff access to plaintiff's goods stored in the railroad's warehouse
despite the fact that the goods were threatened with imminent destruction by fire.
The railroad was found liable under a conversion theory. Donnell v. Canadian Pac.
Ry., 109 Me. 500, 84 A. 1002 (1912). The court emphasized that the unusual
immediacy of the danger to the goods justified invoking the theory of conversion.
It stated, however:
Under ordinary conditions we should gravely doubt if the acts of the defendants agent could be regarded as tantamount to a conversion.

Id. at 503, 84 A. at 1004.
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collateral is moved to another jurisdiction without the secured party's
being informed, the security interest may become unperfected and
thereby subject to the superior claims of other creditors or a bankruptcy trustee.6" Have the responsible corporate officers improperly
interfered with the collateral by moving it-an act that could fit easily
into the definition of conversion-or have they merely failed to cause
the corporation to comply with its contractual obligation to give notice
and obtain consent? The answer to that question, which could be
determinative of liability in conversion, has absolutely nothing to do
with the blameworthiness of the officers.
In the case described in Comment 2(c) to § 9-306, cash proceeds
are deposited in the debtor's general checking account and thereafter
paid out in satisfaction of other legitimate obligations. The recipients
of the funds, of course, take free of the secured party's interest. These
transactions would presumably constitute breaches of the typical security agreement. Allowing such deposit of the proceeds would be a
breach of the affirmative covenant to segregate the proceeds and might
be construed as mere nonfeasance, not amounting to a conversion.
Furthermore, at the moment after deposit, the secured party's interest
in the proceeds is both valid 9 and perfected.7" Not only might there
have been no malfeasance but, at least in theory, no injury. Paying out
the proceeds, however, is an affirmative act that constitutes a breach
of the covenant prohibiting transfer of the collateral and results in
complete divestment of the secured party's interest. Assuming that
manager A, with full knowledge of the requirements of the security
agreement, allowed the deposits to be made, and that manager B, without such knowledge, sent out the checks to other creditors, presumably
only B would be liable in conversion while only A would be at fault.
D. Good Faith
Although conversion must be based on intentional conduct, there
is, at least in the classical formulation of the tort, no requirement that
the defendant have knowledge of the wrongfulness of his act. 7' As one
67 The effect of moving collateral within a state on the perfection of a security

interest therein is governed by UCC § 9-401. The 1962 Official Text suggests several
alternative
approaches. The effect of interstate moves is governed by UCC § 9-103.
6
8 A proper distinction may be drawn between the manager who inadvertently
failed to notify the secured party about collateral moved in the normal course of
business and the manager who knowingly fails to give the requisite notice with the
intention of later disposing of the collateral free of the secured party's interest. The
potential injury to the creditor is the same in either case, but the arguments for and
against
imposing his loss on the manager are quite different.
69
UwiFop CommaEcIAL CODE § 9-306(2).
TOd. §9-306(3).
71 See W. PRossER, supra note 30, § 15, at 83.
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court put it, "neither good nor bad faith, neither care nor negligence,
neither knowledge nor ignorance, are the gist of the action." 72
In Morin v. Hood,73 the plaintiff held a duly recorded mortgage on
certain store fixtures. The defendant, as agent of the owner-mortgagor,
conducted an auction sale of these fixtures, presumably on the mortgagor's premises, and remitted the proceeds to the mortgagor. The
court held the auctioneer liable to the mortgagee for the full sales price
of the fixtures, saying:
The plaintiff as mortgagee under this recorded mortgage had
sufficient legal interest in the fixtures covered thereby to maintain an action for conversion against anyone who sold them
without his consent .

.

.

. His action can be maintained

against an auctioneer who sells such property on order of the
mortgagor even if he does so in good faith and without knowledge of the rights of the mortgagee.7 4
Apparently the sole significance of the recordation, in the court's
view, was to qualify the mortgagee as a proper plaintiff. There is no
indication that the auctioneer's ability to have discovered the mortgagee's interest by searching the record was essential to imposing
liability on him, nor is there any intimation that he was chargeable with
the knowledge of his principal.
The concept of liability without fault is borne out by United States
v. Matthews.75 In that case, one Wheaton had mortgaged his livestock
to the Farmers' Home Administration, and the mortgage had been
promptly recorded in the county in which Wheaton resided and in
which the mortgaged property was located. Wheaton subsequently
removed the livestock to an adjoining county, where Matthews, an
auctioneer, as Wheaton's agent, sold them in the regular course of
business. Wheaton had warranted to Matthews that the animals were
free of liens and, although there was no evidence that Matthews had
searched the record, such a search in the county of delivery would not
have revealed the existence of the mortgage. Nonetheless, Matthews
was held liable for the full sale price of the livestock.
Notwithstanding such holdings, which indicate that an agent's
actual or constructive knowledge of a third party's interest is immaterial to his liability, a special rule seems to have developed where
the defendant's relationship to his principal is corporate manager rather
than independent agent. Thus, in Darling & Co. v. Fry,7 the plaintiff
Poggi v. Scott, 167 Cal. 372, 375, 139 P. 815, 816 (1914).
96 N.H. 485, 79 A.2d 4 (1951).
74 Id. at 486, 79 A2d at 5.
75 244 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1957).
76 24 S.W,2d 722 (Mo. App. 1930).
72
73
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manufacturer had delivered fertilizer to a corporation pursuant to a
written agreement reserving title in the plaintiff, giving the corporation
the power to sell, and requiring the corporation to segregate the proceeds of sale and account to the plaintiff semi-annually.7 7
The defendant became the manager and executive officer of the
corporation about two years after the consignment agreement had been
executed. Upon the sale of merchandise delivered to the corporation
by the plaintiff and subsequent to the defendant's employment, the proceeds were deposited in the corporation's general bank account and used
to pay other corporate obligations. The corporation thereafter became
insolvent, and the consignor brought an action in conversion against
the manager.
Although there was conflicting testimony, the manager testified,
and the jury apparently believed, that he had no actual knowledge of
the consignment arrangement. On appeal, judgment for the defendant
was affirmed, the court holding that, absent actual knowledge, the defendant owed no duty of investigation to the plaintiff.
It is impossible to reconcile the result in Darlingwith that in Morin
under a conversion theory, which both courts purport to apply. In
both cases the defendants were acting solely as agents and could have,
but had not, discovered the plaintiff's rights. If any distinction were
possible, it would cut the other way. Certainly the agent in complete
control of the principal's business is chargeable with more knowledge
than an unrelated agent employed for a special situation. Darling and
cases like it 78 seem to recognize that good faith should be a defense for
the corporate manager acting in the corporate interest. If that is true,
the theory of conversion is inappropriately applied.
E. Damages
The measure of damages in conversion is the value of the converted
property at the time of conversion.7 9 For the secured-party plaintiff,
damages are limited to the amount of the secured indebtedness, since
any excess would presumably be returned to the debtor or junior secured
parties after the satisfaction of his claim. This limitation, however,
may not restrict his recovery to the loss caused by the conversion.
In the event of a debtor's insolvency, the critical fact that determines the secured party's loss is not what the collateral was worth at
77 This arrangement would probably be construed today as a "consignment intended as security" and, hence, subject to article 9. See UNIFORm CommERCIAL CODE

§ 9-102 (2).

78 See,

e.g., Santa Barbara v. Avallone & Miele, Inc., 270 N.Y. 1, 199 N.E. 777

(1936).
79 RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TORTS §§ 222A, comment c, at 433 (1965).

1971]

GOOD FAITH PERFORMANCE OF SECURITY AGREEMENTS

21

some antecedent date, but what the secured party would have realized
if the debtor had properly performed the security agreement. In a
bankruptcy, for example, the value of an unperfected security interest
is zero, since it is subordinated to the rights of the trustee."0
Thus, in Warren Tool Co. v. Stephenson,8 where the creditor had
intentionally refrained from perfecting its interest in the anticipated payment from the bankrupt corporation's customer, it could not reasonably
have expected anything in the very event against which it sought to
protect itself. If the check had not been received by the date of bankruptcy, it would have been properly claimed by the trustee.8 2 If it had
been received and, in accordance with the planned procedure, deposited
in the corporation's bank, the creditor could not have successfully challenged the trustee's competing claim.3 And even if it had been received, deposited, and thereafter paid to the creditor during the nine
days before the bankruptcy, the trustee probably could have recovered
it as a voidable preference.8 Measuring the creditor's actual position
against what it would have been if the managers had meticulously complied with the agreement, the creditor had lost nothing. The true cause
of the creditor's loss was its own failure to perfect; the managers' conduct was largely irrelevant. But, by affording the creditor relief against
the individual managers, the court put it in a better position than that
in which it would have found itself had there been no default.
The policy of article 9 requires notoriety for security arrangements as a protection for anyone who deals with the debtor." If that
policy is to be fully implemented, the creditor who, in cooperation with
the debtor, seeks to create a secret lien deserves little solicitude from
the law. It is inconsistent to furnish him with a windfall, even at the
expense of his co-conspirators. The defense of contributory fault is a
familiar concept, and it should be particularly applicable when the
secured party's fault is calculated to mislead innocent third parties while
the manager's fault injures only a party who is in pari delicto.
On the other hand, a secured party can sustain damage from managerial conduct that does not amount to conversion and that thus
would not warrant recovery under that theory. The manager's failure
80 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 9-301(1), (3).
81

11 Mich. App. 274, 161 N.W2d 133 (1968).

82

Bankruptcy Act §70(c), 11 U.S.C. § 110(c)

(1970).

83

See id.
84Md. §§60(a), (b), 11 U.S.C. §§96(a), (b) (1970).
85

As an illustration of the importance with which perfection is regarded, the

Permanent Editorial Board for the UCC has proposed that § 9-301 be amended to
subordinate an unperfected security interest even to a lien creditor with actual knowledge thereof.

REvImw COMMITTEE FOR ARTICLE 9 OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE, PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, FINAL

REPORT 77-78 (1971).
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to give the proper information about the location of the collateral,
records, or offices can prevent the secured party from properly perfecting
his interest, with the consequent subordination to the claims of lien
creditors, certain purchasers, and-most importantly-a trustee in bankruptcy.80 An unauthorized sale of collateral, even when the purchaser's
rights are subject to the security interest either expressly or pursuant to
the provisions of article 9, may put the secured party to the expense of
a law suit to establish his rights. Notwithstanding the theoretical
preservation of the security interest, such conduct on the part of corporate managers would surely defeat the secured party's legitimate expectations. Whether the managers might be liable under strict conversion theory is at least subject to considerable doubt.
III. A NoN-PROPERTY APPROACH
Almost without exception, the cases that have imposed liability
on the manager of a corporate debtor have been premised on the concept of a security interest as property. Section 1-201 (37) defines a
security interest as "an interest in personal property."
Section 9-102 (2)
indicates that article 9, which governs the vast majority of commercial
security transactions, "applies to security interests created by contract
. ... " In cases involving only the secured party and the debtor, there
is generally no need to distinguish between interests that are property
and those that are contractual. It is only when one litigant is not a
party to the security agreement that the distinction becomes important,
since only a property interest is thought to be binding on a stranger to
the contract. When a court holds that a secured party's rights are
merely contractual, the non-party defendant is usually home free.
Although the manager of a corporate debtor is not, in the strictly
legal sense, a party to the security agreement, he is surely not a stranger
in any realistic sense of that word. His duties, to whatever extent he
has duties, grow out of the corporation's duties under the security
agreement and his relationship to the corporation. In the adjudication
of a dispute between a secured party and the manager of a corporate
debtor, I suggest that sound analysis will be promoted, and undesirable
distinctions avoided, by focusing on the contractual aspects of the
secured party's rights.
A. The Statutory Scheme
The structure of the UCC lends some support to this approach.
Nowhere in the entire UCC is a security interest described as a lien.
86

In re Dennis Mitchell Indus., Inc., 419 F.2d 349 (3d Cir. 1969).
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On the contrary, the use of the word "lien" is strictly limited to noncontractual interests arising out of legal or equitable process or by
operation of law. Thus, under § 9-301(3) an attaching or levying
creditor acquires a lien. Section 7-209 sharply distinguishes between a
warehouseman's lien, which is a creature of the law and of the nature of
the parties, and a warehouseman's security interest, which results only
from the agreement of the parties. Similarly, § 9-310 deals with liens
for materials and services arising from statute or common-law. Every
consequence that flows from the use of the word "lien," and the
historical property concepts it connotes, does not necessarily apply to
the UCC security interest. As Professor Gilmore points out, "No
mortgage statute ever attempted the impossible task of defining what is
a 'mortgage.' A mortgage is what the courts, in the light of history
and contemporary practice, say, is a mortgage." '7 It would not be
earth-shaking for a court to hold that an article 9 security interest is
neither more nor less than article 9 provides-a bipartite agreement
that establishes the rights and obligations of the parties inter se and
creates priorities against identified classes of third parties.
In disputes between secured parties and the particular third parties
embraced by the provisions of part 3 of article 9 the question is invariably one of priority. In that context, a security interest may indeed
be indistinguishable from what is generally called a lien. The concept of
the equitable lien, so heavily relied on by the court in Warren Tool Co.
v. Stephenson,"' was developed to settle priority problems and may not,
in the words of Mr. Justice Holmes, "do much more than express the
opinion of the court that the facts give priority to the party said to have
it . ... " 89
Hopefully, the vast majority of priority problems will now be
settled under the express provisions of part 3. For those that are not,
the equitable lien may continue to have some vitality?
But its use
should be confined to solving the problems that necessitated its invention
and not extended to questions whether liability should or should not
be imposed in a situation that has nothing to do with priority. As
between secured party and debtor, for example, the concept of the
equitable lien has been applied to compel the debtor to execute a
promised mortgage document. 1 So long as the rights of others were
8T 1 G. GILMoRE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 11.1, at 335
(1965).
88 11 Mich. App. 274, 161 N.W.2d 133 (1968).
89 Sexton v. Kessler & Co., 225 U.S. 90, 99 (1912).
90See 1 G. GLMmORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 11.1, at
336-37 (1965).
91 Schrot v. Garnett, 370 Mich. 161, 121 N.W.2d 722 (1963).
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not involved, the identical result could have been reached, without use
of the lien label, by merely holding that the plaintiff was entitled to
specific performance of the defendant's promise.92
Apart from questions of priority, the analogy between a security
interest and a lien is far less compelling. The secured party's interest
in collateral not in his possession is derived from two sources-part 5
of article 9 and the security agreement. Even the provisions of part 5,
which enable the secured party to take possession of and sell or retain
the collateral upon default, and thus could be said to create property
rights,93 are largely repetitive of what a secured party will demand in
his security agreement as a matter of course. The chief thrust of part 5
is, in fact, to limit rather than to establish the rights of the secured
party, and it is interesting to note that the sole reference to conversion
in all of article 9 is § 9-505 (1), which gives the debtor the right to
recover in conversion from the secured party if the latter has failed to
make a timely and proper disposition of the collateral.
In the businessman's view, there is a significant difference between
the kind of an interest held by a secured party and what is commonly
thought of as property. The managers of a corporation operating a
trust business or a public warehouse are entirely aware that their enterprises are custodians of the property of others. When they deal improperly with that property, even for the benefit of their corporation,
they should not be surprised when personal liability results.94 Collateral
subject to a security interest, however, is regarded quite differently.
The corporation bears the risk of loss or depreciation of the collateral,
stands to profit from its enhancement in value, continues to enjoy its
use, and carries it on its balance sheet as a corporate asset. The restrictions that a security agreement may impose on the corporation's
right to use, dispose of, sell, or encumber the collateral are, in the view
of the businessman, contractual undertakings of the corporation. The
collateral itself belongs to the corporation.
Again the UCC lends some support. Section 9-311 makes the
debtor's rights in collateral, including, presumably, the right to possession, freely transferable and reachable by the debtor's creditors "not92 The equitable remedy of specific performance is particularly applicable to
security transactions because the creditor, by hypothesis, has been unwilling to rely
on his normal remedy at law-an action for damages. Cf. text accompanying note
110 infra.
93 The property concept of a security interest may have to be employed in order
to qualify the secured party as a proper plaintiff in an action to replevy the collateral
upon default. The replevin action and similar "property-type" remedies available to
the secured party in an action against the debtor are functional equivalents of the
specific enforcement of the security agreement.
94 See Taylor v. Alston, 79 N.M. 643, 447 P.2d 523 (1968) (public warehouse);
Duncan v. Williamson, 18 Tenn. App. 153, 74 S.W.2d 215 (1933) (trust company).
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withstanding a provision in the security agreement prohibiting any
transfer or making the transfer constitute a default." " Section
9-318(2) enables one who in an article 9 transaction, assigns a contract right, to make a good faith and commercially reasonable modification of or substitution for the basic contract, fully effective against
the assignee, even if "such modification or substitution is a breach" of
the assignor's agreement with the assignee. Neither of these sections,
of course, permits the debtor to defeat the legitimate rights of the
secured party with impunity, but both support the view that the secured
party's rights against the debtor are essentially contractual.
B. An Alternative Theory-Interference With Contract
The abandonment of the concept of a security interest as property
need not leave the secured party remediless against the faithless manager
of a debtor corporation. The secured party and the corporation are
unquestionably parties to the security agreement, and it is well settled
that an action will lie against one who tortiously interferes with a contractual relationship. 6 It goes without saying that a corporate manager
whose conduct of the enterprise results in the corporation's breach of a
security agreement has interfered with a contractual relationship.
Whether such interference constitutes an actionable tort is the hard
question. One court has decided that it might.
In Carpenterv. Williams, 7 a corporate debtor, as security for an
indebtedness to Williams, the plaintiff, pledged certain notes then held
by the corporation. The plaintiff and the corporation agreed that the
notes were to remain in the possession of the corporation for the purpose
of collection, with the proceeds to be paid to the creditor to apply against
the debt. Less than two months later the corporation was adjudicated
a bankrupt and the notes were nowhere to be found.
The plaintiff thereupon instituted suit against Carpenter, a director and the president of the corporation, who had, on behalf of the
corporation, negotiated the transaction. Setting forth the above facts,
he alleged that the defendant had "wilfully, intentionally and wrongfully
95 The Florida Attorney General has recently held that UCC § 9-311 has repealed,
by implication, a provision in that state's criminal code making it a misdemeanor for
a person to "pledge, mortgage, sell, or otherwise dispose of any personal property to
. which shall be subject to any written lien, . . . without the
him belonging, .
written consent of the person holding such lien . . . ." Florida Attorney General
GuIDE 51,504 (1971). If one
Opinion No. 071-6, 4 CCH SECURED TRANSAcTio

adopts the reasonable construction that a "written lien" is equivalent to a contractual
security interest, this opinion confirms the notion that an article 9 security interest,
as between the parties to the security agreement, is to be regarded as a contractual
interest.
96 See W. PRossER, supra note 30, § 129.
9 41 Ga. App. 685, 154 S.E. 298 (1930).
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[and] by reason of said unlawful con-

version" " was liable to the plaintiff to the extent of their value. The
defendant demurred on the ground that, because under local law there
could be no effective pledge of negotiable instruments without actual
delivery,99 the plaintiff did not have an interest in the notes that would
support an action for conversion.
The court first noted, in dictum, that while the plaintiff's nonpossessory interest was clearly ineffective against creditors and innocent
purchasers, it was enough of an interest to qualify the plaintiff in an
action for conversion. Such a holding would have conformed with
cases in other jurisdictions, some of which have been discussed, 100 and
the court might have affirmed the lower court's overruling of the
demurrer on that basis alone. But, in an effort to be doubly certain,
and perhaps because of some gnawing doubts that defeating an interest
otherwise so easily subject to defeat could amount to conversion, 0 1 the
court went on to say:
Moreover, even if the petition may not be sustained,
either as an action of trover or as a suit for damages for a
conversion, we are still of the opinion that it sets forth a cause
of action.
The petition shows that the plaintiff had valuable
rights under a contract which subsisted between him and the
[corporation] . . . and that with knowledge of this fact the

defendant wilfully committed acts which made it impossible
for the company to perform its obligations under the contract; and we think the principle . . . applicable . . .

[that it is] actionable for one maliciously or without justifiable
cause to induce another to break his contract with a third
person, to the damage of the latter. While the defendant may
not technically have induced the company . . . to break its
contract, he . . . caused it to do so .... 102

The problem with this theory, when applied to a corporate manager,
and absent a very restrictive construction of the words "maliciously or
without justifiable cause," is its broad sweep. A corporation's breach
of any obligation can almost invariably be attributed to, and, therefore,
98

1d. at 688, 154 S.E. at 299.
99 Under the UCC, possession is usually essential to the perfection of a security
interest in negotiable instruments. UNIFORMX COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-304(1). There
are, however, two statutory exceptions. Id. §§ 9-304(4), (5).
100 E.g., Hinkle Iron Co. v. Kohn, 229 N.Y. 179, 128 N.E. 113 (1920) ; Warren
Tool Co. v. Stephenson, 11 Mich. App. 274, 161 N.W.2d 133 (1968).
101 This is, perhaps, just another way of expressing the holding of Benedict v.
Ratner, 268 U.S. 353 (1925).
102 41 Ga. App. at 689-90, 154 S.E. at 300.
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caused by, the acts of its managers. If a corporation pays creditor A
and thereby or thereafter becomes insolvent, leaving creditor B unpaid,
it has, by paying A, prevented performance of its contract with B. To
hold the manager who caused A to be paid liable for damages to B
would be to make that manager an involuntary guarantor of every
corporate debt. To avoid reaching such an absurd result, the courts
have articulated a defense, usually characterized as a privilege, that a
corporate manager is free from liability for causing his corporation to
breach a contract when the breach is committed in good faith and for
the benefit of the corporation. Such a view prevails in those jurisdictions that have considered the problem." 3
The situation herein considered concerns the corporate manager
who causes his corporation to breach its security agreement for the sole
purpose of satisfying other legitimate corporate objectives and without
prospect of personal gain, except as it might result indirectly from the
improved financial condition, or even the survival, of the corporation. 0 4
Therefore, the requirement that the breach be for the benefit of the
corporation has, by hypothesis, been satisfied.
The significance of good faith in this formulation, however, is a
more difficult concept with which to deal. In the recent case of Wampler
v. Palnmerton,'0 5 the plaintiff had contracted with a corporation to perform certain logging operations extending over a period of years. About
a year after performance had begun, the corporation, without apparent
justification, failed to make payment to the plaintiff for logs that had
been delivered pursuant to the contract. The court acknowledged that
the corporation had committed an unexcused breach of its contract.
The plaintiff, presumably upon the theory that the contractual right of
action belonged to his trustee in bankruptcy, 10 sought damages, not
from the corporation for its breach, but from the corporate managers
for having caused the breach. After reviewing the development of
both the tort of interference with contract and the privilege of corporate
managers to interfere in good faith and for the benefit of the corporation, the court concluded by saying:
We do not believe that "good faith" as used here can reasonably mean anything more than an intent to benefit the corporation .

. ..

103 See 3 W. FLETCHER, supra note 2, § 1001; Avins, Liability for Inducing a
Corporation to Breach Its Contract, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 55 (1957).
104 See Note, Interference with Contract Rights and the Stockholder's Privilege,
54 Nw. U.L. Rmv. 483 (1959).
105250 Ore. 65, 439 P.2d 601 (1968).

106Id. at 73-74, 439 P.2d at 605.
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. . . So long as the officer or employe acts within the
general range of his authority intending to benefit the corporation, the law identifies his actions with the corporation. In
such a situation the officer is not liable for interfering with a
contract of the corporation any more than the corporation
could be liable in tort for interfering with it. The words
"good faith" should not be employed to render a corporate
officer or employe liable for engaging in morally questionable
activities upon behalf of his principal that nevertheless would
if he were acting for himself as the party to
not be tortious
1 7
the contract.

In the view of the Wampler court, a finding of conversion, with
all its historical prerequisites, would have been essential to imposition
of liability on the defendant in Carpenterv. Williams."8 Such a view
would permit a corporate manager, without fear of personal liability,
knowingly to cause or permit his corporation to violate the terms of a
security agreement so long as the violation did not constitute a recognized tort and the manager sought no independent personal gain. By
equating good faith with corporate benefit, the Wampler court has
made corporate benefit the only test that need be satisfied to establish
the privilege.
C. Whose Obligation of Good Faith?
The draftsmen of the UCC were evidently aware of the saying that
good things (including faith) come in small packages. The text of
§ 1-203, in its entirety, reads as follows:
Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation
of good faith in its performance or enforcement.
There can be little doubt that the typical commercial security agreement
is a "contract . . . within this Act."

Although "its performance" by a

debtor corporation is, in theory, a purely corporate activity, it is unreal
to conclude that no "obligation of good faith" is imposed on the individual managers who, in fact, determine what the corporation does.
If the obligation of good faith, however limited and defined, is to have
any meaning in the regulation of commercial transactions, which are
for the most part conducted by corporations, corporate managers must
come within its scope. Corporations have assets and liabilities. Only
people have good or bad faith.
The courts have wisely recognized that the personal liability of the
responsible corporate managers cannot result from their causing the
107 Id. at 76-77, 439 P.2d at 607 (footnotes omitted).
108 41 Ga. App. 685, 154 S.E. 298 (1930).
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breach of every kind of corporate contract. To hold otherwise would
be to destroy the concepts of representative management and limited
liability, which may be the most important attributes of the corporate
form. But that need not lead to the conclusion that there may not be
some kinds of contracts the breach of which, under certain circumstances, is inconsistent with good faith, irrespective of corporate benefit.
I submit that the security agreement, or at least certain provisions
thereof, is that kind of contract.
The question of managerial liability for causing the breach of a
security agreement is of serious financial import to the secured party
only when, and only because, the corporation cannot respond to a judgment for damages resulting from the breach. This, however, is true for
all corporate contracts.0 9 The characteristic of the security agreement
that distinguishes it from other corporate obligations, is that its primary function is to safeguard the secured party's interest in the precise
event of the corporate debtor's insolvency. If the managers can cause
their corporation to breach a security agreement with the same impunity
as any other contract, the secured party may find himself with only an
unsecured claim against the corporation for the amount of his debt.
This is exactly what he would have had if there had been no security
agreement in the first instance. Therefore, if the security agreement is
to be accorded any independent significance, and its unexcused breach
is not to be an injury without a remedy, the secured party ought to be
compensated by some right he would not have otherwise had."'
One might conclude that this risk of defeasance is inherent in nonpossessory security transactions, and that any creditor who is unwilling
to undertake such a risk should stick to real estate mortgages and pawn
brokerage. Such a conclusion would be a return to the business and
legal philosophy characteristic of an earlier era and inconsistent with
the objectives of the UCC's framers.l n In order to facilitate financing
transactions at reasonable cost, for the mutual benefit of borrowers,
lenders, and the economy in general, article 9 permits the secured party
109 The theory that corporate insolvency should be the determinative factor in
the imposition of managerial liability is properly rejected in Note, Liability of
Directors and Other Agents for Procuring Breach of Corporate Contract, 48 HIARv.
L. REV. 298 (1934).
110 Upon the breach of an ordinary contract by a corporation, the injured party
acquires a right to collect damages. If the corporation is insolvent, that right may
well be almost worthless, but it is nevertheless a right that arose from the breach
and that the injured party would not have had in the absence of the breached
contract.
111

The aim of this Article is to provide a simple and unified structure within
which the immense variety of present-day secured financing transactions can
go forward with less cost and with greater certainty.
UNFoRM COMMERCILA CODE § 9-101, Comment.
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to give the corporate debtor almost absolute power to defeat a security
interest in certain types of property widely used as collateral. Without
such power, inventory financing, non-notification accounts-receivable
financing, and a wide variety of transactions involving negotiable instruments and documents could proceed, if at all, only at an increased
and unnecessary cost. The price of such power is responsibility, and
one name given to responsibility by the UCC is good faith.
In connection with its factoring operation, one leading commercial
financer " 2 frequently obtains from the principal managers of its corporate debtors an agreement entitled "Guaranty of Validity," whereby
they give their assurance that all assigned receivables will be the consideration for bona fide sales of merchandise and will be free of any
third party claims. Such an agreement is, in essence, an undertaking
of the managers not to misrepresent. It does not make the manager a
guarantor of the loan, of the assigned accounts, or even of the corporation's continued solvency. He guarantees only his own integrity. If
a corporate manager should refuse to execute such a document, I suspect the financer might look elsewhere for customers.
Although no instance of this has come to my attention, there is no
reason a similar undertaking could not be obtained from the managers
of a corporate debtor, to whom possession or control of collateral is
necessarily entrusted in connection with the particular financing operation. Such a "Guarantee of Good Faith," as it might be called, would
obligate the managers neither for the corporation's debt, nor for the
maintenance of the collateral's value, but only for the good faith performance of the corporation's promise to preserve the secured party's
interest in the identified collateral. Although such agreements would
be particularly applicable to transactions involving cash proceeds, inventory, chattel paper, instruments, and documents, they could be adapted
to other non-possessory security arrangements in which important but
less obvious risks of defeasance exist.
Were I counsel to the secured party, such good faith guarantees
would have great appeal. The obvious advantage is that, in the event
of the corporate debtor's insolvency, the secured party would have a
clear-cut contractual right of action against one or more solvent defendants who, by their conduct, had defeated his legitimate expectation
of recovery. Even more important, however, would be their deterrent
effect. No individual manager, having subscribed to such an agreement, could legitimately expect to be insulated from liability for bad
112 The cooperation of a number of lenders and their counsel was of great assistance in the preparation of this Article. The author's gratitude can only be acknowledged in such general terms, for one condition of this cooperation was that the specific
identity of these sources of information not be revealed.

1971]

GOOD FAITH PERFORMANCE OF SECURITY AGREEMENTS

31

faith conduct by the corporate veil. Criminal statutes notwithstanding,
the threat of civil liability is both a powerful and an entirely proper
method of regulating the conduct of businessmen. When they know it
exists, they respond accordingly. Finally, from a purely business point
of view, the refusal of the corporate managers to execute such an agreement, provided that it was properly limited in scope,1 3 would not be an
encouraging indicator of the corporation's prospective proper performance.
In my capacity as a law professor, I find this idea (which I believe
to be my own) mildly offensive. In a system that embodies a pervasive
obligation of good faith, an express undertaking to act honestly should
not be essential to impose liability on those who do not. One should
not have to negotiate for an agreement to act honestly from those individuals who are, in fact, the only instruments by which corporate
dishonesty can be implemented. In the ideal commercial world, all
participants will understand and appreciate what they may or may not
do. Until we arrive at that happy point, however, the good faith guarantee might serve as a welcome reminder.
D. The Meaning of "Good Faith"
Good faith is defined in § 1-201(19) as "honesty in fact in the
conduct or transaction concerned." Such words have been historically
construed as applying only to the actor's subjective state of mind." 4
So limited, the good faith obligation might prove inadequate to deal
with the instant problem.
The manager of a failing business not infrequently believes with
deep conviction-honestly, if you will-that all that is needed to turn
the corner is a little more money and a little more time. When he deals
improperly with the collateral securing an obligation in order to obtain
either or both, his purely subjective motive is to save the business. He
does not act maliciously in the sense that he wants to injure the secured
creditor. Rather, he hopes to avoid financial disaster for the mutual
benefit of the owners and all the creditors of the business. In some
instances (those we never hear about) his judgment is correct.
The whole point of the secured transaction, however, is that the
debtor's management is not privileged to make that judgment. The
security agreement imposes restrictions on the normal prerogative of
113 Counsel for one lender has predicted that great resistance might be anticipated
to the execution of any form that contained the term "guaranty." Even though
proper drafting may satisfy the borrower's counsel that the requested undertaking is
appropriate, it may be necessary to invent a title that will not preclude the borrower
from at least taking the agreement to his counsel for review.
114 See Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 V, CHI. L, REv. 666 (1963).
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management to dispose of the debtor's assets in any way that it alone
determines will most benefit the enterprise. 1 5 A unilateral reversal of
that determination can hardly be justified by any quantum of managerial
optimism. It is certainly not commercially reasonable conduct.
Professor Farnsworth suggests that "[g]ood faith performance
[as opposed to good faith purchase] properly requires some objective
standard tied to commercial reasonableness." 1 6 In fact, § 2-103(1) (b)
defines good faith as including, in the case of a merchant, "the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade."
Unfortunately, this definition is confined, by the terms of the statute,
The reasoning that led to the imto article 2 sales transactions."
position of an objective standard of good faith in the performance of
sales transactions by businessmen, however, is equally applicable to the
performance of security transactions by the same businessmen. This is
especially true when, as in Admiral Corp. v. Winchester Corp.,"' there
is a unitary transaction that has both sales and security aspects.
The principles of article 2 have already been extended, by analogy,
to encompass transactions that do not literally fall within its ambit." 9
Their extension to impose a standard of commercial reasonableness to
the performance of security transactions by businessmen would lack
neither logic nor precedent. Indeed, though with express statutory
support, the concept of commercial reasonableness has probably been
applied by the courts in article 9 default cases more frequently than in
any other area covered by the UCC.1 2°

But, whatever route is taken

to introduce some standard of commercial reasonableness, it should be
introduced because it makes absolutely no sense to excuse a businessman
115 Even under the broad formulation of the corporate privilege set forth in

Wampler v. Palmerton, 250 Ore. 65, 76-77, 439 P2d 601, 607 (1968), it could be
said that the manager who causes his corporation to violate a security agreement is
not acting "within the general range of his authority," since the execution of the
security agreement by the corporation is a revocation of the manager's authority to
deal with the collateral contrary to the provisions thereof.
116 Farnsworth, supra note 114, at 671.
117 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-103(1) ; see id. § 1-201, Comment 19; cf. id.

§ 7-404.

118 7 UCC REP. SERv. 743 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1970).
119 In Sherrock v. Commercial Credit Corp., - Del. -, 269 A.2d 407 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1970), the court held that a merchant buyer, to take free of a security
interest under 13CC §9-307(1), must act in "good faith" as defined in UCC §2-103
(1) (b), which includes a standard of commercial reasonableness. The court stated,
"If the standard of good faith is to have meaning in Article 9 with regard to
merchants, it should not vary with that applied to merchants under Article 2." See
also Farnsworth, Implied Warranties of Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57 CoLum. L.
Rtv. 653 (1957).
12o The requirement is imposed on the secured party with respect to procedure

on default.

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

§§9-502(2), 9-504(1), (3), 9-507(2).

In

virtually every case the secured party is in business while the debtor may or may
not be. In the situation discussed in this Article, the debtor is always in business,
or, more accurately, recently out of business.
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from intentionally causing his corporation to breach its security agreement and defeat the secured party's legitimate expectations on the sole
ground that he had vainly hoped the enterprise might thereby be saved.
E. The Sacred Covenants
The comprehensive financing agreement, which includes the security provisions and may sometimes be described as a security agreement,
typically contains dozens of covenants. The breach of some of these
covenants, even when knowingly and intentionally caused, is not inconsistent with good faith. If an obligation of good faith is to be imposed on the corporate debtor's management, one must identify the
particular covenants breach of which might give rise to managerial
liability.
The first category of covenants includes those that set forth the
corporation's basic obligation to pay the principal of the underlying debt
with interest and, perhaps, appropriate penalties for lateness. The
possibility that the managers might cause the corporation to breach
these covenants, and leave the secured party to his remedies for collection
under the law and the agreement, is a risk knowingly undertaken by
the secured party, and should not result in managerial liability any more
than the failure to cause the corporation to pay an unsecured debt. The
Wampler court has aptly expressed this conclusion:
The person contracting with the corporation cannot reasonably have any contractual expectancy that does not take into
consideration the fact that the corporation may be advised to
breach the contract, in accordance with its interest, by a person
whose duty it is to do so. 2 '
A second category of covenants is principally concerned with the
preservation of the value of the collateral. In this category are promises
to keep the collateral insured against fire and other casualty, to maintain
the collateral in good operating condition, and to refrain from using the
collateral in any manner that might impair its value. Both the secured
party and the corporation have an interest in the performance of these
covenants since a decline in the value of the collateral is also a decline,
of equal magnitude, in the value of the corporation's assets. Thus the
creditor is afforded some protection by the manager's duty to the corporation not to mismanage its affairs and the reasonable expectation
that the managers will not act contrary to their own, the corporation's,
and the creditor's interests, all of which are presumably parallel. Furthermore, the creditor can, without undue inconvenience and without
121 Wampler v. Palmerton, 250

Ore. 65, 75, 439 P.2d 601, 606 (1968).
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impeding the normal flow of commerce, take certain precautions for his
own protection. He can require, in connection with the covenant to
insure, that he be a named insured and demand evidence of proper
coverage from the insurer. He can also, by maintaining such contact
with the debtor's operations that reasonable business prudence would
demand, spot, in its incipiency, any tendency toward sloppy management
practices that might ultimately impair the value of the collateral. 22
The case for imposing liability on managers who even deliberately
cause the corporation to breach covenants in this second category is not
a compelling one. The identification of the secured party's interest with
that of the corporation and the threat of liability to the corporation for
unjustified conduct against its interest should deter a manager from
intentionally causing such breaches. The normal expectation of a manager to be free from liability to outsiders in connection with his conduct
of the corporation's business should not be defeated except when there
is no other reasonable control.
A third category of covenants occupies a unique position. These
covenants are those concerned with the preservation of the secured
party's interest in the collateral, that is, his ability to look to those assets
for the satisfaction of his debt upon the corporation's default. They
include the covenants to segregate, account for, and deliver the proceeds
of inventory and receivables; the prohibitions against sale, assignment,
mortgage, or other disposition; and the covenant not to move the collateral without prior notice to and consent of the secured party. Other
than the avoidance of a declaration of default, which, in the desperate
situation when the survival of the enterprise is at stake, can be considered a mere detail, there is no corporate interest in the performance
of these covenants. In fact, the breach of such covenants may be in the
corporate interest, at least as that interest appears to the managers,
because it enables the corporation to satisfy other obligations or to
obtain additional credit. The secured party alone is injured by such
breaches, and it is for his sole protection that such covenants are
designed.
It is against breaches of these covenants that the secured party
needs protection. Their performance depends solely on the corporate
managers, and their enforcement against the corporation is meaningless
in the event of corporate insolvency, which will almost invariably accompany their breach. Good faith performance is required by the
UCC. When it is not rendered, there can be no more appropriate
sanction than to impose, on those who knowingly and intentionally
prevent it, liability to the injured party.
122 This is the principal value of acceleration clauses discussed in note 26 supra.
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F. A Comparison of Theories
In the vast majority of cases either of the two theories discussedconversion and interference with contract-will lead to the same result.
The basic difference is one of adaptability. Conversion is many
centuries old, and its attributes have been developed in settings far removed from the modern commercial world.'3 On the other hand,
interference with contract is a comparative babe-in-arms.' 24 Its
boundaries can be adapted to commercial realities far more readily and
without conflict with factually inapposite precedents. To my knowledge, the theory has not been applied to this kind of commercial dispute
except in the single case of Carpenter v. Williams, 2 ' which in the view
of one commentator might, and probably should, have been decided
solely on the theory of conversion 2 6
With full appreciation of the pitfalls of stating a black-letter rule
of law, one is attempted below:
If a corporation is the debtor under the terms of a
security agreement, any manager of said corporation
(1) who knows or, by reason of his position, ought
to know, of the material provisions of such security
agreement, and
(2) who, not in good faith, including observance of
reasonable commercial standards, willfully causes
or knowingly permits the said corporation to breach
any provision of such security agreement the effect
of which breach is to defeat or diminish the secured
party's interest in the collateral
shall be liable to the secured party for the amount of
the secured party's loss proximately caused by such
breach.
Some of the advantages of looking at the problem from the contractual
aspect can best be illustrated by pointing out the advantages of this rule
in comparison to the inadequacies of conversion discussed in Section II
of this Article.
1. Property
The historic limitations of conversion would not be available as
defenses when the collateral was other than tangible personalty or in123 See Warren, Qualifying as Plaintiff in an Action for a Conversion, 49 HAV.
L. REv. 1084 (1936).
124 The tort first appeared in definite form in 1853 in England and "is now

recognized virtually everywhere."

W. PRossER, supra note 30, § 129, at 929-30.

125 41 Ga. App. 685, 154 S.E. 298 (1930) ; see text accompanying note 97 supra.
126 Note, Liability of Directors and Other Agents for Procuring Breach of
Corporate Contract, 48 HARv. L. REv. 298, 300 n.12 (1934).
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tangibles merged in a writing. This is particularly significant in the
light of the large volume of financing now collateralized by accounts
and contract rights and may develop additional significance in future
situations in which that amorphous and limitless category of general intangibles is used for security. The draftsmen of article 9 express the
hope that "new forms of secured financing, as they develop [will] fit
comfortably under its provisions." " One would also hope that any
theory for the imposition of liability on the managers of a corporate
debtor would have the same capacity to accommodate new developments.
2. Security Interest
It would not be necessary to spin webs of conceptualism to force
the secured party's interest into some historically labelled category.
The secured party's interest, if it constitutes a reasonable commercial
expectation, is deserving of protection no matter what one calls it. If
it is defeated, the proper inquiry is whether the conduct responsible for
the injury is or is not entitled to superior protection. If not, liability
should follow.
3. Intentional Act
There would be no intentional-act requirement like that generally
regarded as a sine qua non in a suit for conversion. Rather the significance of intention would be whether the manager intended to interfere
with the corporation's performance of its obligation, regardless of the
manner of interference. 28 Thus, the manager who, with full knowledge
of his corporation's obligation to segregate the proceeds of the sale of
inventory collateral, knowingly permits a subordinate employee to deposit such proceeds in the general bank account, with the probable consequence that the funds will be paid to others, would be no less liable
for the secured party's loss than if he had himself paid out the money
to others. Whether the manager knowingly permitted the proscribed
procedure would, of course, be a question of fact in any particular case,
but at least it would be the right question.
4. Good Faith
A duty premised on good faith ' cannot be breached by one who
is unaware that the duty exists. Consequently, a corporate manager
12 7 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-101, Comment.

128 See W.

PROSSER,

supra note 30, § 129, at 936.

129

In actions for interference with economic relations, the defendant's motive
or purpose frequently is the determining factor as to liability, and sometimes
it is said that bad motive is the gist of the action.
Id. § 129, at 927-28 (footnotes omitted). Compare quotation in text accompanying
note 72 supra.
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who, by either intentional conduct or omission, caused his corporation
to breach a security agreement would not be liable for causing the breach
unless he had, or, at the very least, should have had, knowledge of the
existence and the material terms of the agreement. This is essentially
an affirmation of the good faith defense successfully raised by the defendant in Darling & Co. v. Fry,' which, although purportedly decided on the theory of conversion, departed from the normal standard
of conversion liability in which good faith is irrelevant. The Darling
court may have gone too far by holding that actual knowledge of the
security arrangement was necessary to impose liability on the defendant,
who had been the corporation's manager and chief operating officer for
a substantial period of time. Whether a manager without actual knowledge should be charged with such knowledge by reason of his position
in the corporation would also seem to be a proper question of fact in
each case. In any event, the lower-echelon manager, while, perhaps,
technically guilty of conversion,' would avoid liability for even his
most deliberate acts unless he in fact knew them to be violative of the
corporation's obligation.
5. Damages
In contrast to conversion, where the damages are measured by the
absolute value of the collateral, a court would attempt to evaluate the
secured party's loss by comparing his actual position with what it would
have been in the event that the security agreement had not been
breached.' 32 Thus, when a corporation had become bankrupt, the holder
of an unperfected security interest could recover from a corporate manager only when that manager, without complicity of the secured party,
had been instrumental in preventing perfection.' 33 The secured party
130 24 S.W.2d 722 (Mo. App. 1930) ; see text accompanying note 76 supra.
131 According to strict conversion theory, any person who intentionally mailed a
check drawn on a bank account in which the proceeds of collateral had been deposited
would be guilty of conversion, whether that person was merely a clerk or the
president and chairman of the board. As a rule, creditors of a corporation do not
sue its clerks.
132 Some speculation might be involved in determining whether what actually
occurred would have occurred if the agreement had not been breached. Assume, for
example, a creditor holding an unperfected security interest. Breach of the agreement
and dissipation of the collateral might actually lead to a quiet insolvency without
judicial proceedings. On the other hand, performance of the agreement, if a large
amount were involved, might have triggered an involuntary bankruptcy to recover the
payment as a preference. In such a case, perhaps bankruptcy should be assumed
even if it did not, in fact, ensue.
133 This view is borne out, in a slightly different context, by the court in Bruer
v. Sanford Atl. Nat'l Bank, - Fla. Supp. -, 247 So. 2d 764 (Dist. Ct. App. 1971).
There, the debtor corporation had mortgaged its equipment to Bruer, who failed to
file a financing statement. Subsequently, in violation of the security agreement with
Bruer, the corporation mortgaged the same equipment to a bank, which promptly
filed. Upon a later sale of the corporation's assets, including the mortgaged equipment, the manager of the corporation assumed the obligation to the bank. Only
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who, by intention or negligence, fails to ensure that his interest is perfected has no legitimate expectation to be protected in the event of bankruptcy. Conversely, an unauthorized transfer of collateral made in bad
faith would result in the liability of the responsible manager, to the
extent that it caused a secured party to lose, even though the security
interest had been preserved inviolate. The question of proximate cause,
slippery though it may be, is one with which courts have long dealt
with reasonable success.

CONCLUSION

There is, perhaps, no commercial contract under which one party
relies on the good faith performance of the other to a greater degree,
and with greater risk, than the non-possessory security agreement.
Because the party relied upon is typically incorporated, the quality of
its performance is determined by persons who are not even parties to
the contract. Apart from the criminal law, there is no statutory regulation of their conduct. The necessary application of "principles of law
and equity" evokes a uniquely large and confusing assortment of tort,
contract, property, and corporate concepts.
In this Article, I have attempted to develop a combination of concepts more relevant to the commercial realities than those the courts
have heretofore applied. However, as one of my wiser colleagues has
observed, 13 4 they are still only concepts. Good faith performance has
been aptly defined as the fulfillment of reasonable commercial expectaIn the absence of a statutory solution,' 3 6 the courts should
tions.'
focus less on the concepts and more on the question whether or not
the quality of a participant's conduct merits the fulfillment of his
expectations.
then did Bruer file. When the purchaser defaulted, the manager paid the bank and
proceeded to replevy the equipment as the bank's subrogee under UCC §9-504(5).
Admitting that the bank had priority under the first-to-file rule of UCC § 9-312(5)
(a), Bruer claimed that the manager was equitably estopped from being subrogated
to that priority. In holding for the manager, the court held that the defense of
estoppel was not available to Bruer unless his delay in filing was "due to a reliance
upon some conduct, act or omission to act on the part of [the manager]." Id. at 766.
The dissenting judge, who relied almost exclusively on the good faith obligation of
UCC § 1-203, colorfully remarked that "[t]he provisions of the Uniform Commercial
Code were not intended to wash the stains of broken promises from this [manager]
plaintiff's bands." Id. at 767.
134 This is an appropriate point, though belated, to express my deep appreciation
to Professor Noyes Leech of the University of Pennsylvania Law School. He is,
among others, a fine teacher and scholar. He is, however, an editor without a peer.
135 Farnsworth, supra note 114, at 669.
136 The adoption of a UCC provision addressed to this problem is not anticipated
in the near future. Between now and the time, if ever, that such a provision is
implemented, such problems will best be solved by a combination of creative lawyers
and intelligent judges operating in the context of a real commercial situation.

